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INTRODUCTION 
The article by Howard Kunreuther and Erwann Michel-Kerjan 
provides a powerful overview of changes in extreme weather-related 
events.  Supported by empirical evidence, they show that in recent 
decades insurers have, more than before, been confronted with catas-
trophic losses resulting from weather-related events (e.g., hurricanes 
and flooding).  Moreover, they also predict that it is very likely that 
these types of high-damage events will occur even more in the future.  
The authors’ contention can hardly be debated; one could easily cite 
other studies that equally predict that as a result of climate change it is 
likely that in the (near) future more of these extreme weather-related 
events will lead to high losses.  Much evidence in this respect is gath-
ered in the studies prepared for the Third Assessment Report (TAR) 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which 
holds that it is very likely that in almost all land areas humans will ex-
perience higher maximum temperatures and that various extreme 
weather events can be the expected result.1  The IPCC predicts heavy 
rainfalls in particular areas, and other extreme weather events like 
droughts and cyclones in other areas.2  Even during the week of this 
Symposium, the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) gathered in 
Nairobi,3 where a report was presented that argued that by 2040 it is 
 † Maastricht University Faculty of Law. 
1 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], WORKING GROUP I, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2001:  THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS 574-75 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001); 
see generally id. at 87-97 (providing an overview of the climate system, as well as natural 
and human-induced climate variations). 
2 For a discussion of the likelihood of an increase in tropical cyclones, see id. at 
606. 
3 November 6-17, 2006. 
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likely that the damage resulting from climate change might be as high 
as one trillion dollars annually.4
This study merits two comments.  First, even though one could ar-
gue that these estimates often relate to total losses (which are by defi-
nition much higher than the insured losses), it is likely that (as the au-
thors rightly argue) insurers will be confronted with more losses from 
weather-related events.  Moreover, the amount of losses per incident 
will be higher as well.  Second, although there is of course (as many 
contributors to the Symposium mentioned) still a lot of debate among 
scientists as to whether the predicted increase in these extreme 
weather events is actually the result of anthropogenic emissions, this 
does not matter from an insurance perspective.  As Kunreuther and 
Michel-Kerjan rightly mention, for an insurer it is not directly relevant 
whether this increase in extreme weather-related events is the result of 
climate change.5  All that matters for the insurer is that empirical evi-
dence suggests that an increase in extreme weather events is likely to 
occur in the future.  Insurers and reinsurers have long understood the 
importance of climate change to their businesses and have devoted 
various studies to this topic.6
The central question discussed by Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 
is under what conditions insurers can play a role in covering the dam-
age caused by these extreme weather-related events (whether or not 
4 See UNITED NATIONS ENVT. PROGRAMME FIN. INITIATIVE CLIMATE CHANGE WORK-
ING GROUP, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY TO CLIMATE CHANGE:  THE ROLE OF THE 
FINANCE SECTOR 14 (2006) (“[I]t seems very likely that the [sic] there will be a ‘peak’ 
year that will record costs over 1 trillion USD before 2040.”). 
5 See Howard C. Kunreuther & Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, Climate Change, Insurabil-
ity of Large-Scale Disasters, and the Emerging Liability Challenge, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1797 
(2007) (tying insurers’ cognizance of climate change to the litigation of the liability of 
directors and officers for failure to prepare for the phenomenon). 
6 For examples of these studies, see ALLIANZ GROUP & WORLD WIDE FUND FOR 
NATURE, CLIMATE CHANGE & THE FINANCIAL SECTOR:  AN AGENDA FOR ACTION 25 
(2005) (suggesting means by which insurers can offset exposure to the risks associated 
with climate change) and PARTNERRE, IS PARTNERRE AT RISK?  CLIMATE CHANGE:  IM-
PACTS ON REPUTATION, UNDERWRITING AND INVESTMENT RESULTS 11-22 (2003) (ex-
ploring the impacts of climate change on PartnerRe).  The insurability issue also re-
ceived attention from the Secretariat of the UNFCCC.  See generally Joanne Linnerooth-
Bayer et al., Insurance-Related Actions and Risk Assessment in the Context of the 
UNFCCC 1 (May, 2003) (Background Paper for UNFCCC workshops, commissioned 
by the UNFCCC Secretariat), available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ 
workshops/other_meetings/application/pdf/background.pdf (discussing the role of 
insurance as a risk-transfer mechanism in the context of catastrophes resulting from 
climate change). 
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they are caused by climate change).7  To answer this question, the au-
thors focus on the central notion of insurability.  They provide an 
overview of the classic criteria that are advanced in the literature to 
judge the insurability of certain risks.  In my comments below, a few of 
these insurability criteria will be discussed in further detail, a few will 
be added, and Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan’s analysis will be ex-
tended by addressing some of its policy implications.  Indeed, in their 
concluding remarks, the authors briefly address (mainly as a point for 
further research) the question of how policy should react to these 
threats to the insurability of damage caused by climate change—more 
particularly, they suggest a role for the government. 
In this Commentary, I will suggest that it is difficult to discuss the 
insurability of the catastrophic losses that potentially will be caused by 
climate change without addressing these policy issues.  The nature of 
the damage caused by climate change is indeed such that it poses se-
rious problems both on the demand side as well on the supply side, as 
I argue in Parts IV and V.  Hence, it may not be possible to judge the 
insurability of those risks without addressing the question of whether 
some intervention at the policy level is necessary to facilitate this in-
surability.  Before addressing these more fundamental issues, I would 
first like to focus on two classic insurability conditions, which are of 
particularly more importance for judging the insurability of liability for 
climate change:8  (1) retroactive liability and (2) causal uncertainty.   
I.  RETROACTIVE LIABILITY 
A.  Efficiency 
A classic source of worry for insurers, particularly in the area of 
environmental liability, has been the retroactive character of liability 
rules.  In some cases, legislators explicitly opted for a retroactive liabil-
ity regime;9 in other cases, judges held that a particular behavior (like 
7 In the remainder of this Commentary, I will still refer to this type of damage as 
“damage caused by climate change,” although the reader should realize that from an 
insurability perspective, it does not matter whether or not it is climate change that 
causes the increase in these extreme weather-related events. 
8 Indeed, it was the potential liability for climate change damage that was the cen-
tral focus of the Symposium and the issue discussed by Professors Kunreuther and Mi-
chel-Kerjan.  See Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 1841 (discussing the po-
tential liability of firms for the harms visited upon the firms they insure). 
9 See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000) (providing for retroactive liability).  See gen-
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dumping toxic waste) was already considered wrongful at the moment 
when the act happened (e.g., twenty-five years ago) even though it 
may be doubtful that this actually was the case.10  A retroactive liability 
rule has been heavily opposed in the law and economics literature for 
the simple reason that a finding of liability can only affect future be-
havior.11  Thus, retroactive liability can never have any beneficial effect 
(in the sense of providing incentives for prevention) for a behavior 
that already occurred in the past.12  If one were to consistently reject 
retroactive liability, however, and hold an injurer to comply merely 
with an “old” standard of care, the problem would arise that standards 
could never be adapted to changes in technology.  Therefore, it has 
been argued that the fact that there may be liability ex post may give 
incentives to obtain information about risk to industrial operators.13  
In order to have a dynamic adaptation of liability standards to evolu-
tions in technology, a system of so-called “prospective overruling” has 
been suggested.  This means that a new liability standard would only 
apply to future cases, but not to the current case that raises the issue 
before a court.  This would still allow for a dynamic process of learn-
ing by courts whereby the standard of care is not static, but changes 
over time.14
erally Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart, Introduction, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND:  
ECONOMICS, SCIENCE, AND LAW 3 (Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995) 
(providing critical analyses of CERCLA’s retroactive liability).  A strict retrospective 
liability was laid down for the restoration of contaminated sites in the United King-
dom’s Environment Act of 1995.  See B. Jones, The Identification and Remediation of Con-
taminated Sites:  The United Kingdom’s Environment Act of 1995, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR MI-
LIEUAANSPRAKELIJKHEID [Envtl. Liability Review] 159, 159-63 (1995) (summarizing the 
Act’s main provisions). 
10 For examples and a discussion of this “retroactive case law,” see Gerrit Betlem & 
Michael Faure, Environmental Toxic Torts in Europe:  Some Trends in Recovery of Soil Clean-
Up Costs and Damages for Personal Injury in the Netherlands, Belgium, England and Germany, 
10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 855 (1998). 
11 For a discussion of the economics of legal transitions with applications to tort 
law, see generally Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 509, 520-63 (1986). 
12 See James Boyd & Howard Kunreuther, Retroactive Liability or the Public Purse?, 11 
J. REG. ECON. 79, 80 (1997) (arguing that retrospective liability “weaken[s] the incen-
tive to take precautions against future environmental costs”). 
13 See generally Steven Shavell, Liability and the Incentive To Obtain Information About 
Risk, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1992) (modeling the relative efficacies of various negli-
gence rules). 
14 For examples of such a prospective overruling in German case law, see 5 JAMES 
BOYD ET AL., TORT AND INSURANCE LAW:  DETERRENCE, INSURABILITY, AND COMPENSA-
TION IN ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY:  FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
59-60 (Michael Faure ed., 2003).  See also Claus Ott & Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Negligence as 
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In the case of liability for climate change damage, retroactivity 
may be a serious problem.15  If one is already willing to accept a causal 
relationship between anthropogenic emissions and damage caused by 
climate change, the problem will arise that many of these emissions 
may have taken place in the distant past, when information about 
such a causal link was lacking.  Of course, it is debated whether infor-
mation about (or suspicion of) such a causal link was available.  Some 
reports suggest that even as early as the beginning of the nineteenth 
century there was already scientific evidence available on the effect of 
emissions by industry on the climate.16  From a legal perspective, how-
ever, the relevant question is whether at that time (even assuming that 
information on the causal link was indeed available) emissions would 
already have been wrongful in order to justify an action in tort.17  The 
precise time of that moment is debated.  Roda Verheyen argues that 
since the IPCC published its first report in 1990, states have foreseen 
that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions create a risk of damage.  She 
argues that one could even hold that governments should have been 
aware of such a risk much earlier—in 1950 or even before.18
Whether one also wishes to accept liability for historic emissions 
will to a large extent depend upon the goals one wishes to achieve 
with tort law.19  If deterrence were the only goal, a retroactive liability 
rule may make little sense.  If, however, one accepts other goals of tort 
Untaken Precaution, Limited Information, and Efficient Standard Formation in the Civil Liabil-
ity System, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 15, 16 (1997) (arguing that the collective court sys-
tem can create more efficient determinations of negligence assessment than individual 
courts).   
15 For related discussions, see, for example, Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation 
for Victims of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1605, 1641-47 (2007) (asserting that in-
juries from climate change should be adequately compensated) and RODA VERHEYEN, 
CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:  PREVENTION DUTIES AND STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY 178-83 (2005) (discussing the retroactivity issue in the context of the 
requirement of foreseeability for establishing international climate change liability). 
16 See Richard S.J. Tol & Roda Verheyen, State Responsibility and Compensation for 
Climate Change Damages:  A Legal and Economic Assessment, 32 ENERGY POL’Y 1109, 1123-
25 (2004) (providing data describing the share of industrial carbon dioxide emissions 
in the world). 
17 Cf. Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Allocating Responsibility for the Failure of Global 
Warming Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1657, 1665 (2007) (arguing that the debate on li-
ability for climate change has a more prospective than retrospective nature). 
18 VERHEYEN, supra note 15, at 183. 
19 On these goals, see Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law:  Affirming Both 
Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1801-02 (1997) (discussing the 
goals of retribution and deterrence, and then proposing a mixed theory of tort law 
that incorporates both). 
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law,20 including distributional justice and compensation, liability even 
for historic emissions could become meaningful again. 
B.  Insurability 
The assertion that climate change damage (at least partially) may 
have begun in the distant past, when CO2 emissions originated, may 
have some bearing on the liability issue, but may not necessarily pre-
vent climate change liability.  The issue that Kunreuther and Michel-
Kerjan address in their article is the insurability of climate change li-
ability.  No matter how one views the desirability of retroactive liability 
for climate change damage itself, we have to recall that retroactive li-
ability is often considered to endanger the insurability of particular 
risks.21  If insurers are confronted ex post with their insured’s liability 
for an act that was not wrongful at the time when it was committed, 
insurability is endangered for the following reasons:  (1) no premium 
could be asked for this risk, (2) no reserves could be set aside, and (3) 
no preventive measures could be required.22
Therefore, the conclusion from this literature is straightforward:  
if a type of liability for climate change damage23 were to be accepted, 
it would be desirable from an insurability perspective to limit this li-
ability.  The liability should then be limited more particularly (assum-
ing that this is technically possible) to the damage caused from the 
moment that the emitters knew or should have known that their emis-
sions could have caused climate change, and thus that there was 
wrongfulness in tort.24  From that moment insurers could also have 
20 See, e.g., Farber, supra note 15, at 1642 (arguing that “a rule that requires com-
pensation for past emissions can provide a precedent for future liability schemes that 
cover other emerging environmental harm”). 
21 See Boyd & Kunreuther, supra note 12, at 82-83 (noting that retroactive liability 
reduces firm value, thus reducing in equal measure the firm’s incentive to protect 
against future environmental costs). 
22 See generally Michael Faure & Paul Fenn, Retroactive Liability and the Insurability of 
Long-Tail Risks, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 487, 490-93 (1999) (modeling the insurability 
of retroactive liability). 
23 The reference here is to the type of liability discussed in Kunreuther & Michel-
Kerjan, supra note 5, at 1841. 
24 See Richard Zeckhauser, 19th Annual Lecture of the Geneva Association:  Insurance 
and Catastrophes, 78 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 3, 5 (1996) (arguing that retrospec-
tive liability may affect the predictability of the risk).  For a similar conclusion on the 
insurability of retrospective (environmental) liability risks, see Kenneth S. Abraham, 
Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 957-59 (1988) 
(arguing that retroactive liability, such as the scheme established by CERCLA, frus-
trates the insurance function because its costs are unanticipated and it is very difficult 
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required a premium, set aside a reserve, and instituted preventive 
measures to reduce the risk.  Limiting the liability to the moment that 
emitters25 knowingly contributed to climate change allows liability to 
help prevent climate change and increases the insurability of climate 
change damage. 
II.  CAUSAL UNCERTAINTY 
A.  Possible Solutions 
Another classic condition for insurability of (environmental) li-
ability is that the insured injurer is only held to compensate for the 
damage caused by her activity.  Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan rightly 
argue that this problem of causation will be a major issue when assess-
ing climate change liability.  Uncertainty concerning the causal rela-
tionship is one of the major issues addressed in any paper discussing 
climate change liability.26  If a classic “but-for” test were to be applied, 
it is clear that many actions in climate change liability would be 
doomed to fail.  Most plaintiffs will not succeed in proving that, but 
for the defendant’s emissions, the damage resulting from climate 
change would not have taken place.  Indeed, many uncertainties arise.  
The causal uncertainty playing a role in the case of climate change is, 
of course, primarily a question of whether there is a clear and certain 
causal link between anthropogenic emissions and climate change.  Al-
though the experts gathered in the IPCC seemed increasingly con-
vinced of an effect of anthropogenic emissions on the likelihood of 
climate change, they also indicated that a large degree of uncertainty 
remains.27  In addition, there can be uncertainty as to the contribu-
tion of one particular polluter (or state, in the case of international 
to insure) and Martin T. Katzman, Pollution Liability Insurance and Catastrophic Environ-
mental Risk, 55 J. RISK & INS. 75, 85 (1988) (discussing the difficulty of calculating risk 
and loss distribution of future chemical disasters). 
25 Here I only consider liability of emitters (given the focus on insurability).  Simi-
lar questions related to the goals of climate change liability, however, also arise when 
addressing state liability under international law. 
26 See, e.g., David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea:  Tort-Based Cli-
mate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 22-33 (2003) (providing an overview 
of causation and the determination of liability for climate-change-related damages); 
Jaap Spier, Legal Aspects of Global Climate Change and Sustainable Development, INDRET, 
Apr. 24, 2006, at 1, 9-10, http://www.indret.com/pdf/346_en.pdf (asserting that, “for 
the time being,” global warming is too complex an issue to attribute causality to a spe-
cific polluter). 
27 IPCC, WORKING GROUP I, supra note 1, at 59-61. 
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climate change liability) to the particular climate change damage at 
issue.  Moreover, the relationship between a particular emission of 
GHGs and the damage that is suffered (e.g., property damage result-
ing from flooding) may be quite remote and the damage may be due 
to causes other than the CO2 emissions.  A plaintiff in such a case will 
therefore hardly be able to prove that her particular damage has been 
caused by the emissions of the particular defendant.28  She can, at 
best, suggest that the defendant has (partially) contributed to the risk 
of climate change damage.  Some scholars have therefore come to the 
assistance of plaintiffs by proposing the use of a so-called proportional 
liability rule,29 which generally states that scientific evidence would 
have to determine the likelihood that the defendant’s behavior con-
tributed to the particular risk (expressed as a percentage, say 10%).  
The defendant would accordingly be held liable to compensate 10% 
of the plaintiff’s losses.  This proportional liability rule has been ap-
plauded in the law and economics literature, especially where it was 
compared with the threshold liability rule, which is inherent in the 
application of the but-for test.  The straightforward argument is that 
the but-for test (requiring that there should be a likelihood of more 
than 50% that the defendant’s behavior caused the plaintiff’s loss) will 
often lead to underdeterrence (in cases where the probability is sys-
tematically lower than 50%) or to overdeterrence (in cases where the 
probability is systematically just over 50%).30  The proportional liabil-
ity rule has the advantage that it forces the defendant to compensate 
the plaintiff’s loss in proportion to the way in which the defendant 
contributed to the risk.31
28 A defendant could be either a particular state (in the context of international 
climate change liability) or a corporation (like an energy producer).  For a discussion 
of the difference between the two types of liability, see Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, 
An Economic Analysis of State and Individual Responsibility Under International Law 5-31 
(Univ. of Chicago Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 279 
(2d Series) and Stanford Univ. Law Sch., John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ. Paper 
No. 318, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=885197. 
29 See Grossman, supra note 26, at 31-33 (noting the possibility—in the context of 
climate-change-related harms—of apportioning damages among the defendants on 
the basis of the relative sizes of their market shares). 
30 See Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of 
Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 472-75 (1980) (providing examples illustrating this asser-
tion); Steven Shavell, Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 
J.L. & ECON. 587, 588-90 (1985) (critiquing the “threshold probability” theory of liabil-
ity). 
31 For discussions of the proportional liability rule, see William M. Landes & Rich-
ard A. Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 417, 425-31 (1984), John Makdisi, Proportional Liability:  A Comprehensive Rule 
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B.  Insurability 
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan discuss this proportional liability 
rule, but are critical of it.  They argue, inter alia, that there can still be 
a high amount of scientific uncertainty.  In addition, they hold that 
even under a proportional liability rule many practical problems will 
still remain for plaintiffs.  All of that is undoubtedly true.32  Within the 
framework of a discussion of conditions for insurability, however, it 
must be admitted that the proportional liability rule has considerable 
advantages compared to the all-or-nothing approach inherent in a 
threshold liability rule.  Many have indicated that an all-or-nothing 
approach (or shifting the burden of proof to the defendant) may 
make the defendant, and thus her insurer, potentially liable for the 
entire market.  It has been indicated in the literature that this may 
cause serious insurability problems.33  The litigation surrounding the 
damage caused by the drug DES exemplifies the debate:  the applica-
tion of joint and several liability amounted to one insurer (that of the 
defendant who was found culpable) having to compensate losses not 
necessarily caused by the policyholder.34  Theoretically, the defendant 
(and her insurer) could still recover from others on the basis of their 
contribution to the risk in a recourse action; however, the costs of re-
course actions may be huge and other defendants may be judgment-
proof.  A proportional liability rule has the advantage of limiting the 
exposure of the defendant (and thus of her insurer) to the propor-
tion that the defendant contributed to the risk.  I reach the same con-
to Apportion Tort Damages Based on Probability, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1063, 1067-75 (1989), Glen 
O. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 
779, 791-95 (1985), and Robert Young, Michael Faure & Paul Fenn, Causality and Cau-
sation in Tort Law, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 507, 516-20 (2004). 
32 Problems of causal uncertainty and the potential benefits of a proportional li-
ability rule to deal with climate change damage are also discussed in contributions to 
this Symposium by Kirsten Engel and Daniel Farber.  See Kirsten Engel, Harmonizing 
Regulatory and Litigation Approaches to Climate Change Mitigation:  Incorporating Tradable 
Emissions Offsets into Common Law Remedies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1563, 1584-92 (2007) (dis-
cussing causal uncertainty and possible legal responses); Farber, supra note 15, at 1629. 
33 See Abraham, supra note 24, at 959-60 (explaining that the risk calculations in-
volved in assessing the likelihood of liability under CERCLA’s joint and several liability 
regime were so difficult that insurers ceased to offer coverage); Katzman, supra note 
24, at 89-90 (arguing that judicial decisions, such as the adoption of joint and several 
liability theories, have diminished the insurability of pollution liability). 
34 Some have argued that shifting the risk of proving causal uncertainty to a de-
fendant has the effect of requiring the defendant’s insurer to insure the entire market.  
See MICHAEL G. FAURE & TON HARTLIEF, INSURANCE AND EXPANDING SYSTEMIC RISKS 
125-27 (2003) (reviewing pertinent literature). 
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clusion with respect to retroactive liability:  no matter how one judges 
the usefulness of various instruments to deal with causal uncertainty, 
from an insurability perspective, a proportional liability rule certainly 
seems to be the preferred mechanism.  Other rules that shift more 
risk to the insurer than is caused by her insured may endanger the in-
surability of the risk. 
Perhaps equally important for the insurability issue are a few top-
ics implicitly discussed in Part III of Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan’s 
article, dealing with the question of whether there will be a sufficient 
supply and demand for insurance covering damage caused by climate 
change, those being two crucial conditions of insurability.35
III.  SUPPLY 
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan indicate that insurers under-
standably get nervous when damage results from extreme weather 
events—the principal reasons being the uncertainty of the risk in-
volved and the lack of insurance capacity.36  The magnitude of the 
damage even in the case of a single weather-related event may, as the 
authors also indicate, easily outweigh the capacity of the private insur-
ance markets, even if possibilities such as pooling or coinsurance and 
reinsurance are taken into account. 
A.  Reinsurance 
As far as possibilities to increase capacity for insuring against 
catastrophic losses are concerned, in Part IV Kunreuther and Michel-
Kerjan discuss other stakeholders who may affect insurers’ decisions, 
particularly reinsurers.  These stakeholders may to some extent rem-
edy the capacity problem and thus increase supply.  Many scholars, led 
by Kenneth Froot, have demonstrated the limited financing of catas-
trophic risks through reinsurance.37  This limited capacity, along with 
35 Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 1810-26. 
36 See Howard Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster Losses Through Insurance, 12 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 171, 178-80 (1996) (contending that low-probability, high-consequence 
events lead individuals to ignore insurance options and cause insurers to avoid offering 
coverage in order to limit their exposure); see also Christian Gollier, Some Aspects of the 
Economics of Catastrophe Risk Insurance, in CATASTROPHIC RISKS AND INSURANCE 13, 17-
18, 23 (OECD ed., 2005) (noting that imperfect scientific knowledge makes it difficult 
for insurers to gauge the risk involved and highlighting the increased transaction costs 
that insurers face in the event of a catastrophe). 
37 See Kenneth A. Froot, The Market for Catastrophe Risk:  A Clinical Examination, 60 J. 
FIN. ECON. 529, 555-59 (2001) (citing capital market shortages as a potential explana-
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high premiums for catastrophe reinsurance, prevents the reinsurance 
industry from providing a strong backup for catastrophic insurers. 
B.  Government 
This finding inevitably leads to the question of how compensation 
can be awarded, given the apparent limits of the reinsurance market 
to cover catastrophic losses.  One possibility is to look at alternative ar-
rangements, such as capital markets, to cover the type of catastrophic 
losses caused by weather-related events.38  Another possibility is to call 
on the government to provide ex post compensation, either ad hoc or 
through a compensation fund.  Such government relief programs, 
however, have often been criticized by economists as being unable to 
provide incentives for prevention.39  The question arises whether in 
fact a third solution could provide a remedy, whereby the government 
does not provide ad hoc compensation as “Santa Claus” but merely in-
tervenes precisely to cope with the problem of lacking capacity for the 
mentioned low-probability, high-damage events.  In practice, one no-
tices that in many domains where losses are potentially large, state in-
tervention exists, usually precisely to cure this problem of deficient in-
surance capacity.  States (or a combination of states) often act as a 
kind of reinsurer of last resort or at least provide some guarantee of 
compensation in case the damage exceeds certain limits.  Tradition-
ally, this state action was merely a guarantee of an additional layer of 
tion for limited reinsurance capacity); Kenneth A. Froot & Steven E. Posner, The Pric-
ing of Event Risks with Parameter Uncertainty, 27 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. THEORY 
153, 154 (2002) (arguing that catastrophic risk pricing is determined by reinsurers 
rather than the market, the consequence of which is that reinsurance prices are inor-
dinately high). 
38 See ERIK BANKS, ALTERNATIVE RISK TRANSFER:  INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT 
THROUGH INSURANCE, REINSURANCE, AND THE CAPITAL MARKETS 115-70 (2004) (dis-
cussing the use of capital markets, including catastrophe bonds, contingent capital, 
and catastrophe derivatives, to cover catastrophic loss); ERIK BANKS, CATASTROPHIC 
RISK:  ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 111-46 (2005) (same); Michael G. Faure, Alternative 
Compensation Mechanisms as Remedies for Uninsurability of Liability, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON 
RISK & INS. 455, 456-57 (2004) (analogizing from the way capital markets could be 
used to provide coverage for nuclear power plants). 
39 See Louis Kaplow, Incentives and Government Relief for Risk, 4 J. RISK & UNCER-
TAINTY 167, 172-73 (1991) (concluding that government relief for risk creates ineffi-
ciencies because individuals do not bear full responsibility for their insurance deci-
sions); George L. Priest, The Government, the Market, and the Problem of Catastrophic Loss,  
12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 219, 228-29 (1996) (arguing that effective risk reduction is 
achieved more easily by market discipline than by government intervention). 
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compensation and added little by way of facilitating insurability.40  Al-
ready in the nuclear liability conventions of the 1960s, a compensation 
system could be found consisting of various layers.  One layer of the 
compensation was provided by the liable licensee of the nuclear 
power plant (and covered through insurance); a second layer was pro-
vided through the state; and a third layer was provided by all the con-
tracting parties.41
The literature is divided on the desirability of these types of facili-
tative strategies as a “third way” to support the functioning of private 
insurance markets.  Anne Gron and Alan Sykes see several difficulties 
with the government providing reinsurance.  Governments, so they 
argue, are unlikely to set premiums in an “actuarially sound fashion” 
(given political pressures for subsidies); therefore, they may not be 
able to play a constructive role in the insurance coverage market.42  
Government involvement would thus distort the market as far as 
stimulating insurability is concerned.  Gron and Sykes instead favor ad 
hoc solutions whereby compensation is provided to victims of catas-
trophes on an ex post basis.  They concede that in such cases there 
may be “some degree of moral hazard,” but they argue that the effect 
may be modest since government compensation is likely to be “in-
complete and uncertain.”43  In the Netherlands, lawyers have made a 
similar criticism after the introduction of a government reinsurance 
program for terrorism risk.44
Other literature has held that there is little objection against the 
government supplementing the market where (re)insurance capacity 
40 However, one could argue that the additional layer of compensation provided 
by the state reduced the amount of damages that had to be compensated through in-
surers, which in turn reduced the insurance capacity needed. 
41 For details of these conventions and for an economic analysis, see, for example, 
Michael G. Faure, Economic Models of Compensation for Damage Caused by Nuclear Accidents:  
Some Lessons for the Revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions, 2 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 21, 
24-25 (1995) and Michael Trebilcock & Ralph A. Winter, The Economics of Nuclear Acci-
dent Law, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 215-17 (1997). 
42 Anne Gron & Alan O. Sykes, A Role for Government?, REGULATION, Winter 2002-
2003, at 44, 51. 
43 Id. 
44 See Karin Ammerlaan & Willem van Boom, De Nederlandse Herverzeker-
ingsmaatschappij voor Terrorismeschade:  en de rol van de overheid bij het vergoeden van terreur-
schaden, 78 NEDERLANDS JURISTENBLAD 2330, 2335-36 (2003) (arguing that the Dutch 
government should not intervene in insurance markets by providing reinsurance for 
the terrorism risks). 
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fails.45  The main argument in favor of this government intervention is 
that without such intervention, compensation through insurance 
markets may fail altogether.  The government intervention could thus 
create a market (or enlarge capacity) in which private insurers are still 
able to compete:  the state would not replace, but simply would facili-
tate, the market.  Of course, a functional program would require first 
that the government charge an actuarially fair premium and second 
that the intervention be temporary.  Hence, the government should 
withdraw the moment that reinsurers or other market alternatives are 
able to take over this function. 
In practice, one can notice many examples of these public-private 
partnerships.46  For instance, in the United States there are many in-
surance schemes whereby the (federal or state) government inter-
venes to act as insurer of last resort and in some cases even as primary 
risk bearer.  The California Earthquake Authority (CEA) assumes 
primary risk-bearing responsibility for the earthquake risk.  The pri-
mary insurer plays an exclusively administrative role and the risk is 
taken over by the CEA.  A similar model has been developed within 
the National Flood Insurance Program.47  Also, as far as the terrorism 
risk is concerned, many governments now provide reinsurance or a 
45 See Kunreuther, supra note 36, at 183 (noting the stability and security offered 
by the Florida hurricane catastrophe trust fund created by state legislation); Howard 
Kunreuther, Neil Doherty & Anne Kleffner, Should Society Deal with the Earthquake Prob-
lem?, REGULATION, Spring 1992, at 60, 68 (arguing in favor of the creation of a federal 
reinsurance agency as a reinsurer of last resort); Reimund Schwarze & Gert G. Wagner, 
In the Aftermath of Dresden:  New Directions in German Flood Insurance, 29 GENEVA PAPERS 
ON RISK & INS. 154, 163 (2004) (contending that the government must be involved as 
the “final insurer,” but only in the case of large damages).  But cf. Scott E. Harrington, 
Rethinking Disaster Policy, REGULATION, Spring 2000, at 40, 40-46 (arguing that govern-
ment intervention promotes inefficient risk management because political pressures 
lead temporary measures to become permanent, which distorts the private insurance 
market). 
46 See Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 1828 (discussing the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners task force); see also Erwann Michel-Kerjan & 
Nathalie de Marcellis-Warin, Public-Private Programs for Covering Extreme Events:  The Im-
pact of Information Distribution on Risk Sharing, 1 ASIA-PAC. J. RISK & INS. 21, 41 (2006) 
(citing the terrorism risk insurance programs in Spain, Australia, France, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States). 
47 See Robert L. Rabin & Suzanne A. Bratis, United States, in FINANCIAL COMPENSA-
TION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES:  A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 303, 330-31 
(Michael G. Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., 2006) (explaining the need for the govern-
ment to take primary responsibility for flood insurance since adverse selection proved 
too great a barrier for private insurance companies). 
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third layer of compensation.48  For example, in Germany, a reinsur-
ance company called Extremus was erected to cover the terrorism risk 
with a state guarantee for amounts above three billion and up to ten 
billion euros.49  Also, in the Netherlands, a reinsurance company for 
terrorism damage was erected as a reaction to 9/11.50  In the United 
Kingdom, reinsurance for the terrorism risk is provided through Pool 
Re.51  In France, the Caisse Centrale de Réassurance (CCR) provides rein-
surance with state involvement for natural disasters and so-called 
technological risks.52  For the terrorism risk, a pool has been created, 
the Gestion de l’Assurance et de la Réassurance des Risques Attentats et Actes 
de Terrorisme, which also enjoys an unlimited state cover through the 
CCR. 
Of course, some of these constructions could undoubtedly be criti-
cized.  Gron and Sykes argue that, in practice, as soon as governments 
“become[] involved in the sale of insurance against disasters, [they] 
do[] little to classify risks or price policies in an actuarially sound fash-
ion.”53  Undoubtedly, the same may be the case for some of the rein-
surance constructions for the terrorism risk.  This type of government 
intervention, however, has the principal advantage that it facilitates 
market solutions and thus avoids the negative distribution inherent in 
48 See generally Bernhard A. Koch & Stefan Strahwald, Compensation Schemes for Vic-
tims of Terrorism, in TERRORISM, TORT LAW AND INSURANCE:  A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 
260, 260-81 (Bernhard A. Koch ed., 2004) (explaining in brief U.S. and European state 
compensation schemes designed to protect victims of terrorist attacks); Jeffrey Manns, 
Insuring Against Terror?, 112 YALE L.J. 2509, 2512-13 (2003) (commenting on the inno-
vative approach of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, which puts the government in 
the role of reinsurer rather than direct insurer); Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Burkhard 
Pedell, Terrorism Risk Coverage in the Post-9/11 Era:  A Comparison of New Public-Private 
Partnerships in France, Germany and the U.S., 30 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 144, 146-
57 (2005) (describing these different approaches to government involvement in ter-
rorism insurance programs). 
49 See Michel-Kerjan & Pedell, supra note 48, at 149-53 (describing the German Ex-
tremus AG program). 
50 This company is called the Netherlands Reinsurance Company for Terrorism 
Damage (Nederlandse Herverzekeringsmaatschappij voor Terrorisme Schade). 
51 See Michael Huber & Tola Amodu, United Kingdom, in FINANCIAL COMPENSA-
TION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES, supra note 47, at 261, 277-78 (explaining that the 
British government reinsures the pool of insurance firms and thus effectively acts as 
insurer of last resort). 
52 For further information on the CCR, see CCR:  Company Introduction, http:// 
www.ccr.fr/gb/gb-1024/ent_presentation.jsp (last visited May 1, 2007)..  See also Michel 
Cannarsa, Fabien Lafay & Olivier Moréteau, France, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR 
VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES, supra note 47, at 81, 101-03 (describing the function of the 
CCR). 
53 Gron & Sykes, supra note 42, at 51. 
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ad hoc compensation.  Of course, a government intervention as rein-
surer should still leave the private insurer with the freedom to choose 
to rely on state reinsurance or not.  A duty to call on the state-
provided reinsurance (as is apparently the case in France) might be 
criticized from the perspective of competition law.54
The question thus arises whether such government intervention 
could also be an attractive remedy to increase capacity problems in 
the case of weather-related events.  If such a state-run program could 
be constructed so that it corresponds with economic starting points 
(such as charging a correct, risk-based premium for this temporary in-
tervention), the disruptive effect of the government intervention 
could be minimized.55  Moreover, this intervention may support the 
insurability of damage caused by extreme weather events resulting 
from climate change as discussed in this volume. 
IV.  DEMAND 
A.  Willingness To Pay Risk Premium 
Kunreuther and Michael-Kerjan mention that one particular 
problem that arises for insurers when dealing with climate change 
damage is the uncertainty concerning both the probability of the oc-
currence and the magnitude of the damage.  One way of dealing with 
this uncertainty, as indicated in earlier work by Kunreuther and oth-
ers, is to charge a so-called “risk premium.”  The risk premium would 
be the appropriate remedy to take account of the uncertainty regard-
ing the probability of catastrophic losses.56  In their article, Kun-
reuther and Michel-Kerjan provide an assessment of the different risk 
premiums that would have to be charged under various scenarios.  
The question arises, however, whether the insurers actually follow this 
advice.  In practice, charging the additional risk premium is not always 
54 See Roger van den Bergh & Michael Faure, Compulsory Insurance of Loss to Property 
Caused by Natural Disasters:  Competition or Solidarity?, 29 WORLD COMPETITION 25, 33-35 
(2006) (delineating the ways in which the French system runs afoul of competition 
law). 
55 In the words of Christian Gollier, “[e]x-post, the social pressure for the public 
indemnification of the uninsured victims of a much publicized catastrophe will be 
strong.  Solidarity kills market insurance.”  Gollier, supra note 36, at 25. 
56 Howard Kunreuther, Robin Hogarth & Jacqueline Meszaros, Insurer Ambiguity 
and Market Failure, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 71, 79-82 (1993) (citing surveys of under-
writers, actuaries, and reinsurers that recommended premiums increase in the face of 
ambiguity). 
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the preferred solution to insurability problems.  This is partially due 
to the fact that insurers are in some cases “systematically more ambi-
guity-averse than consumers.”57  The result may be that the additional 
risk premium charged would be so high that consumers would be un-
willing to pay.  Another possible reason has to do with the well-known 
cognitive limitations and bounded rationality of consumers.  This 
problem has two different aspects.  Psychologists and behavioral law 
and economics scholars have indicated that low-probability events like 
natural hazards are systematically misjudged.58  It is well known that as 
a result of this, individuals will often take an “it will not happen to me” 
attitude.59
Moreover, other psychological experiments have also shown that, 
ex ante, people may prefer uncertain losses rather than the certain 
loss of having to pay a premium.  Kunreuther showed that because in-
surance is considered an investment, some people will refuse to insure 
against low-probability, high-damage events (such as flooding) be-
cause there is a likelihood of never receiving any return during a life-
time.60  These types of insurance provide a low expectation of a return 
on the “investment,” and hence, there is a correspondingly low de-
mand.  Indeed, all of these phenomena indicate that individuals will 
have a low demand for insurance coverage and will certainly not be 
willing to pay the additional risk premium charged by insurers to cope 
with the insurers’ ambiguity. 
57 Gollier, supra note 36, at 24. 
58 See Paul Slovic, Howard Kunreuther & Gilbert F. White, Decision Processes, Ration-
ality and Adjustment to Natural Hazards, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 1, 7 (Paul Slovic ed., 
2000) (describing a misperception about flood insurance). 
59 Kunreuther, supra note 36, at 175; see also Richard A. Epstein, Catastrophic Re-
sponses to Catastrophic Risks, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 287, 293 (1996) (citing Kun-
reuther’s research); Richard Zeckhauser, The Economics of Catastrophes, 12 J. RISK & UN-
CERTAINTY 113, 115 (1996) (same). 
60 See HOWARD KUNREUTHER ET AL., DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION:  PUBLIC 
POLICY LESSONS 248 (1978) (noting that consumers are a key source of catastrophic 
market failure because they view insurance as a poor investment); Paul J.H. Schoe-
maker & Howard C. Kunreuther, An Experimental Study of Insurance Decisions, 46 J. RISK 
& INS. 603, 612 (1979) (offering the possibility that people view insurance as an “in-
vestment aimed at maximizing claim payments in case the hazard occurs”); Paul Slovic 
et al., Preference for Insuring Against Probable Small Losses:  Insurance Implications, in THE 
PERCEPTION OF RISK, supra note 58, at 51, 62-71 (noting that people are more willing to 
purchase insurance when they feel they cannot lose). 
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B.  Result:  Low Coverage 
The result is the well-known phenomenon that, in countries 
where voluntary first-party insurance for catastrophic losses (such as 
the ones caused by flooding) is available,61 victims apparently do not 
insure, or insure only to a limited extent.  The evidence in that re-
spect is overwhelming; Kunreuther and others have already docu-
mented the low demand for earthquake insurance, even in areas that 
are vulnerable to earthquake risks.62  Well known is the example that 
after the Northridge earthquake in California in 1994, a high number 
of citizens decided to buy first-party disaster insurance as a reaction to 
the damages they suffered.  One month later, however, when daily life 
took over, many of those new insurance policies were cancelled.63  
The underinsurance for flooding risks has also already been described 
in the literature.64  Recently, the experience with Katrina showed once 
more that only a low percentage of homeowners purchase flood in-
surance.65  Similar evidence comes from Europe.  For instance, after 
the flooding of the river Elbe in 2002—referred to as the “flood of the 
century”66—it appeared that only a very small percentage of victims 
had insurance coverage.67
61 In some countries, insurance against natural hazards is available only to a lim-
ited extent, or not at all.  This was the case in the Netherlands, where insurance for 
flooding and earthquake risks was for a long time excluded as a result of a cartel 
agreement between insurers who agreed not to cover the particular risks.  As a result of 
intervention from the European competition authorities, these so-called “binding deci-
sions” were abrogated.  For details, see Michael G. Faure & Ton Hartlief, The Nether-
lands, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES, supra note 47, at 
195, 203-06. 
62 See Kunreuther, Doherty & Kleffner, supra note 45, at 60 (noting that Califor-
nians remained uninsured despite knowing that earthquake insurance existed). 
63 For details regarding a voluntary insurance scheme and the human proclivity to 
opt out, see Rabin & Bratis, supra note 47, at 328-29 and Slovic, Kunreuther & White, 
supra note 58, at 14. 
64 See, e.g., Kunreuther, supra note 36, at 173 (presenting statistics that only one-
fourth of households in flood-prone areas had flood insurance in 1995); cf. Zeck-
hauser, supra note 59, at 135 (noting similar underinsurance regarding earthquakes). 
65 In Louisiana the percentage of homeowners with insurance ranged from 7.3% 
in Tangibahoa to 57.7% in St. Bernard’s.  In New Orleans only 40% had flood insur-
ance.  Howard Kunreuther, Has the Time Come for Comprehensive Natural Disaster Insur-
ance?, in ON RISK AND DISASTER:  LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 175, 175 (Ronald 
Daniels, Donald F. Kettl & Howard Kunreuther eds., 2006). 
66 In Germany, the flood is referred to as the “Jahrhundertflut.” 
67 See Ulrich Magnus, Germany, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CA-
TASTROPHES, supra note 47, at 119, 130 (noting that only 50% of households during 
this flood had flood insurance); Schwarze & Wagner, supra note 45, at 156-60 (explain-
ing insurers’ financial troubles in the wake of this flood). 
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C.  Mandatory Coverage 
These findings of course lead to the question of whether, at the 
policy level, the factual availability of insurance should be made com-
pulsory.  If it seems desirable to grant victims of climate change dam-
age compensation as a normative matter,68 mandatory insurance has a 
certain appeal.  Kunreuther already advanced this model for natural 
disasters in 1968,69 and the suggestion was recently repeated after 
Hurricane Katrina.70  The introduction of a regulatory duty to insure 
against the consequences of weather-related events has also received 
support from European legal scholarship.71
A well-known example of such a mandatory insurance for the con-
sequences of natural hazards can be found in France, where all indi-
viduals who have taken out first-party property damage insurance 
policies are required by law to pay a supplementary premium for a 
mandatory coverage for natural disasters.72  There is, therefore, no 
general duty to insure, but a compulsory, complimentary coverage on 
voluntary property damage contracts.  The system is financed through 
an additional premium of 12% on all property damage insurance con-
tracts, which covers damage caused by natural hazards.73  Of course, 
the details of the system are open to critique.  For example, one could 
criticize the fact that the additional premium for the disaster coverage 
is fixed, which limits competition,74 or the fact that coverage will only 
apply if an incident has been declared a catastrophe by the govern-
68 See Farber, supra note 15, at 1607 (assuming such a normative preference while 
discussing the challenges of a compensation scheme). 
69 Howard Kunreuther, The Case for Comprehensive Disaster Insurance, 11 J.L. & 
ECON. 133 (1968). 
70 See Kunreuther, supra note 65, at 186-88 (proposing comprehensive disaster in-
surance in the wake of Hurricane Katrina); Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Rules 
Rather Than Discretion:  Lessons From Hurricane Katrina, 33 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 101, 
102-04 (2006) (advocating mandatory comprehensive disaster insurance instead of ex 
post relief). 
71 For examples of European scholarship, see Michael Faure, Financial Compensa-
tion in Case of Catastrophes:  A European Law and Economics Perspective, in TORT AND IN-
SURANCE LAW YEARBOOK:  EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2004 at 2, 13-15 (Helmut Koziol & Bar-
bara C. Steininger eds., 2005) and Schwarze & Wagner, supra note 45, at 154-168. 
72 For a description of the French system, see Olivier Moréteau, Policing the Com-
pensation of Victims of Catastrophes:  Combining Solidarity and Self-Responsibility, in SHIFTS IN 
COMPENSATION BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS (Willem H. van Boom & Mi-
chael Faure eds., forthcoming 2007). 
73 For details, see Cannarsa et al., supra note 52, at 85-89. 
74 Some competition is of course still possible with respect to the basic housing 
policy to which the mandatory disaster coverage is added. 
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ment, which may lead to undesirable political pressure.  Notwithstand-
ing these criticisms concerning details of the system,75 the model of 
mandatory coverage in addition to voluntarily purchased insurance 
policies may be tempting for climate change damage as well. 
This model also receives some support from behavioral law and 
economics scholars.  It is argued that when disaster insurance is sold 
along with insurance against likely losses (such as housing insurance) 
at a reasonable extra cost, more people will purchase insurance 
against the low-probability loss for which they would otherwise have 
no demand.76  This literature concludes that if it is in society’s best in-
terest for people to insure themselves against unlikely calamities (such 
as weather-related events), adding protection against a small but likely 
loss might help accomplish this purpose.  The question therefore 
arises whether this model—which was advanced as a solution for dam-
age caused by flooding and the like—may also be useful for the type 
of weather-related damage resulting from climate change, which is the 
central focus of this Symposium.  The literature indicates that there 
are several potential dangers to this model, but there are advantages 
as well.77
D.  Dangers 
This section provides a brief summary of potential dangers associ-
ated with the mandatory coverage model. 
Paternalism:  When introducing mandatory disaster coverage, there 
is always a danger that the legislature in fact forces potential victims to 
purchase an insurance policy even if there would be no demand.  The 
problem is that the behavioral literature not only shows a lack of in-
formation (in which case the information asymmetry could constitute 
a reason for a regulatory duty to purchase insurance), but it also dem-
onstrates that even when potential victims are well informed about the 
75 For an example of such criticisms, see Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Insurance Against 
Natural Disasters:  Do the French Have the Answer?  Strength and Limitations 7-14 (Ecole 
Politechnique, Cahier No. 2001-007, 2001). 
76 See Slovic et al., supra note 60, at 71 (suggesting combining “low-probability haz-
ards with higher probability threats in one insurance ‘package’”). 
77 It would of course go too far to discuss all of these in detail within the scope of 
this Commentary.  For a more detailed analysis, see Michael G. Faure, Financial Com-
pensation for Victims of Catastrophes:  A Law and Economics Perspective, L. & POL’Y (forth-
coming 2007) (manuscript at 12-17, on file with author), Kunreuther & Pauly, supra 
note 70, at 101-16; Michel-Kerjan, supra note 75, at 6-9, and Schwarze & Wagner, supra 
note 45, at 165-66. 
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risks, they prefer not to purchase insurance because they perceive the 
policy as an investment.  In the case of low-probability, high-loss 
events, there is a great likelihood that people will be paying a large 
premium without ever having any return during a lifetime.78  Hence, 
this research shows that it is not primarily poor information of poten-
tial victims that would cause the low demand, but rather the unwill-
ingness of victims (even if well informed) to purchase coverage 
against low-probability, high-loss events.  If this were the case, there is 
always a danger that the mandatory insurance in fact amounts to pa-
ternalism.79
Risk Advertising as an Alternative:  If lacking information would be 
the reason for a duty to insure, one could hold that regulation aiming 
at providing information might to some extent be a less intervention-
ist remedy than mandatory insurance.  Showing people the conse-
quences of flooding with visual displays, for example, may help to per-
suade the public to view insurance as a potential remedy.80  A 
weakness in this argument, however, is that behavioral experiments 
have shown that regulation is only marginally successful in curing the 
information deficiency.81
Overgeneralization:  A generalized duty to purchase flooding cover-
age, for example, always entails the risk that the duty is also imposed 
on those who constitute no risk at all, such as the owner of an apart-
ment on the tenth floor.  This problem plays less when a generalized 
duty to provide coverage (for all type of risks) is imposed, such as in 
the French case.  If one cannot be a victim of flooding, there can at 
least be other risks (such as heavy rainfall, winds, or tornados) to 
78 See Slovic et al., supra note 58, at 25-26 (describing the insurance premium as an 
estimate of risk); Slovic et al., supra note 60, at 62 (proposing to reimburse those who 
make no claims as a solution to the preference of insuring against high-probability, 
low-loss events). 
79 See Anthony I. Ogus, Regulatory Paternalism:  When Is It Justified?, in CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT:  CORPORATIONS, STATES, AND MARKETS IN EUROPE, JAPAN 
AND THE U.S. at 303, 303-20 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 2005) (analyzing the benefits 
and risks of paternalist regulation). 
80 See Slovic et al., supra note 60, at 71 (noting the possibility that increased public-
ity may persuade the public that insurance is a matter of community well-being as op-
posed to a personal choice). 
81 See Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischoff & Sarah Lichtenstein, Response Mode, Framing 
and Information-Processing Effects in Risk Assessment, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, supra 
note 58, at 154, 166 (noting various problems standing in the way of effective informa-
tional programs). 
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which one can be exposed.82  This problem is more serious if the duty 
is limited to a specific risk, such as flooding.  In that particular case 
one might be more inclined to limit the duty to specific risk areas, but 
the administrative (and, more particularly, political) costs of identify-
ing those areas may be high.  This was shown in the case of Belgium, 
where a new act of May 2003 introduced additional mandatory cover-
age on voluntary insurance policies, but proposed to apply this new 
solution only to persons living in specified risk areas.  These risk areas 
were to be identified through regulation.83  However, the attempt to 
identify the risk areas led to political disagreement and subsequently 
made it impossible to apply the act.  The result was that in 2005 a new 
system was introduced, which imposed a generalized duty to purchase 
additional coverage for natural hazards in addition to fire insurance.84  
It seemed impossible to pursue the idea of limiting the mandatory 
coverage, given the high political costs of identifying the special risk 
areas where the duty to insure would apply. 
Anti-Competition:  The duty to purchase mandatory disaster cover-
age in addition to voluntarily purchased property damage contracts 
may cause problems from the angle of competition law.  It is a so-
called tie-in agreement forcing a consumer to buy a specific service or 
product together with another product, which may restrict competi-
tion.85
Availability:  Mandatory coverage is of course only a solution where 
insurance markets are available.  As Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan86 
show in their article, in many instances today, catastrophic losses are 
suffered in developing countries, and a large part of these losses is not 
covered under insurance at all.  Where insurance markets are not 
available to a large part of the population, imposing mandatory disas-
ter insurance will of course not be the miracle solution. 
82 But see Schwarze & Wagner, supra note 45, at 165 (critiquing the French system’s 
“dual approach” in which people must insure separately for “storm guarantee” and 
against natural hazards). 
83 Isabelle Durant, Belgium, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATAS-
TROPHES:  A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH, supra note 47, at 37, 66-69 (describing 
the key provisions of the Act of 21 May 2003). 
84 Philippe Colle, De wet van 17 september 2005 betreffende de verzekering van natuur-
rampen, 69 RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD 881, 881-85 (2006). 
85 For more on this issue, see Van den Bergh & Faure, supra note 54, at 25-54. 
86 See Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 1803-04. 
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E.  Advantages 
Noted below are the positive aspects of the mandatory coverage 
model. 
Efficiency:  Given the high number of voters involved, one has to 
realize the politicians will always have the tendency to provide some 
form of compensation after a large number of victims is affected by a 
disaster.  This will undoubtedly also be the case when damage is 
caused by climate change.  In that respect, the solution of some form 
of mandatory coverage for those who are actually at risk seems prefer-
able to the alternative of government intervention through ad hoc or 
structural fund solutions. 
Market Failure:  As already indicated above, the ex post, ad hoc, 
and fund solutions are criticized from both legal and economic per-
spectives.  Law and economics scholars consider ad hoc compensation 
a “catastrophic response[] to catastrophic risk.”87  Many economists 
fear that the government intervention will dilute incentives of parties 
and insurance markets to develop solutions themselves.  The failing of 
insurance markets is, so it is held, a “self-fulfilling prophecy that pro-
pels us into another round of misguided regulation.”88  Kunreuther 
on the other hand indicated that there is no evidence that, ex ante, 
individuals have no demand for insurance coverage merely because 
they would count on ex post compensation through the govern-
ment.89
Distributive Justice:  The insurance solution also has the advantage 
that potential victims of climate change damage can (where insurance 
is available) pay a premium ex ante for a loss that they may suffer 
themselves.  Hence, victims pay in a way for a protection they may re-
ceive ex post.  From a distributional perspective, the solution is clearly 
preferable to a generalized compensation through government 
whereby taxpayers pay at random for some losses suffered by particu-
lar victims. 
Accurate Pricing:  The advantage of the insurance solution is that 
insurance can play an important role in the prevention of risk.  Kun-
reuther and Michel-Kerjan rightly argue in their article that insurers 
can require an adequate risk differentiation and thus contribute to 
87 Epstein, supra note 59, at 287-88. 
88 Id. at 305; see also Gollier, supra note 36, at 25 (arguing that “if citizens believe 
that the state will compensate them for their damages, they will prefer not to insure 
the risk”). 
89 Kunreuther, supra note 36, at 177. 
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adequate prevention, wherever this is possible.90  Again, this proposal 
receives support from behavioral law and economics.  It is argued that 
compulsory insurance is a good example of a policy that can play a 
role in improving hazard perception.  Insurance requires “explicit, 
conscious attention to the risk by the individual concerned,” ex-
pressed through the premium charged.91  Many examples exist of risk 
differentiation applied by insurers as far as the flooding risk is con-
cerned.  For example, in Germany insurers apply a model whereby re-
gions are divided into various risk areas depending upon the probabil-
ity of flooding.  Depending upon the category to which the particular 
property belongs, premiums will be differentiated and, in the case of 
high flood risk, coverage may only be provided after strict individual 
checks.92  Of course, applying these relatively straightforward princi-
ples of risk differentiation may be possible in the case of more-or-less 
traditional natural hazards like flooding, but may be far more difficult 
to apply when risks seriously increase as a result of climate change.  
The underlying reason behind the premium differentiation is to give 
incentives to potential victims to relocate to safer areas.  The question 
of course arises as to whether that is always an option for potential vic-
tims who may lack resources to move to safer (and potentially more 
expensive) areas.  A far-reaching differentiation of risks in cases where 
potential victims have no alternative may thus lead to adverse distribu-
tional consequences. 
Efficient Regulation:  Generally, if there should be any government 
intervention at all, it seems more appropriate for the government to 
focus on measures to facilitate the functioning of insurance markets 
rather than playing “Santa Claus” (e.g., through ad hoc or ex post 
compensation, or through compensation funds).  The latter does not 
positively contribute to the functioning of insurance markets, whereas 
an intervention through government-provided reinsurance would. 
90 Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 1824.  This point is also stressed 
by Priest, supra note 39, at 219. 
91 See Slovic et al., supra note 58, at 25. 
92 See Schwarze & Wagner, supra note 45, at 159-60 (explaining the zoning regions 
in Germany’s coverage plan); CORNELIA R. KARGER, WAHRNEHMUNG UND BEWERTUNG 
VON “UMWELTRISIKEN”:  WAS KÖNNEN WIR AUS DER FORSCHUNG ZU NATUR-
KATASTROPHEN LERNEN?, ARBEITEN ZUR RISIKO-KOMMUNIKATION (Forschungszentrum 
Jülich, Arbeiten zur Risikokommunikation Heft 57, 1996) (discussing the observation 
and valuation of environmental risks and analyzing the extent to which the experience 
with natural catastrophes can provide an example for risk differentiation in the case of 
environmental damage). 
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F.  Evidence 
The French model—which provides mandatory disaster insurance 
in addition to voluntary housing insurances—seems to have become 
increasingly popular in practice.  Several European countries now fol-
low the French example; for instance, as a result of a legislative 
change in Belgium, compulsory flood coverage in addition to the vol-
untary fire insurance has been introduced.93  In Italy, a legislative ini-
tiative aimed at some form of mandatory coverage against damage 
caused by disasters is under discussion as well,94 and the same has re-
cently been proposed in German legal doctrine.95
However, in each of these models, one can notice that there is 
some form of additional reinsurance provided through the state to 
cope with large losses.  It is a form of public-private partnership to 
which Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan refer in their article.96  Appar-
ently this model is now preferred at the policy level over the tradi-
tional “Santa Claus” model, whereby governments provide random 
compensation to some victims ex post.  These ad hoc solutions are 
thus also criticized by lawyers from the perspective of the equality 
principle:  some victims of particular catastrophes may enjoy generous 
government relief, whereas other victims of other accidents may not 
enjoy this ad hoc generosity.97  The appeal of the insurance model 
supported by government is clear:  the government intervention now 
focuses on supporting insurability, some form of risk differentiation 
(which is usually absent in any government compensation program) is 
still possible,98 and those who may benefit ex post from the compensa-
tion also pay ex ante for their protection through insurance premi-
ums.  The question thus arises whether this model may also have some 
appeal if one wishes to provide compensation for climate-change-
related damage as well. 
93 For a description of the changes in Belgium, see Durant, supra note 83, at 37-39. 
94 See Alberto Monti & Filippo Andrea Chiaves, Italy, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION 
FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES, supra note 47, at 145, 186-91. 
95 See Schwarze & Wagner, supra note 45, at 162-63 (making such a proposal). 
96 See Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 1842. 
97 See Magnus, supra note 67, at 124 (criticizing the generous compensation for 
victims of flooding (up to 8.1 billion euros!) after the Elbe flooding in 2002).  For a 
similar criticism, see Zeckhauser, supra note 59, at 114. 
98 See Schwarze & Wagner, supra note 45, at 166-67 (discussing the advantages of 
insurance-based solutions over government disaster funds). 
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CONCLUSION 
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan’s article provides interesting and 
convincing data showing that insurers will have to take into account 
more weather-related incidents with potentially high damage in the 
near future.  In this Commentary, I first focused on some problems 
that may arise in the case of liability insurance for climate-change-
related damage.  Two major issues that will arise in climate change 
litigation are retroactivity and uncertainty about causation.  I argued 
that the way in which these issues are solved may have important im-
plications for the insurability of climate change liability.  Even though 
a retroactive liability (also for past emissions) may be desirable from a 
distributional perspective, it may seriously endanger the insurability of 
such a liability.  The same conclusion can be reached concerning the 
uncertainty over causation:  solutions suggested in legal doctrine (or 
even in case law) amounting to a shift of the risk of causal uncertainty 
to enterprises can cause serious insurability problems.  Many of these 
can be avoided if a proportional liability rule is followed.  Even 
though Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan rightly argue that proportional 
liability may not be the miracle solution to climate change liability 
(since many uncertainties still arise), it may be desirable, as it allows 
climate change liability to remain insurable. 
In addition, I formulated a few further concerns about the supply 
and demand in the case of climate-change-related damage generally.  
To some extent, I continued where Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 
ended their article by asking whether government intervention may 
be necessary.  I argued that the insurability of climate-change-related 
damage can probably not be assessed without taking into account the 
possibility of government intervention.  This may indeed be, as I tried 
to show, to some extent unavoidable in order to guarantee a supply 
and demand for this type of damage, and hence to create an insur-
ance market at all.  I offered the following suggestion for how this gov-
ernment intervention could take place:  (1) mandatory coverage for 
specific weather-related events, if possible limited to specific risk areas 
(if the administrative costs of determining the risk areas are not too 
high); and (2) accompanying facilitative (perhaps temporary) strate-
gies to support the capacity, provided that these are based on market 
principles (i.e., charging a correct price) and promote rather than 
distort competition.  Under these conditions, one may hope that in-
surers, supported by government, may also play an important role in 
covering damage resulting from climate change. 
 
